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The Secondary Market for LDC debt does not operate
in the same way as a stockmarket for a number of
reasons. The most notable difference is the basically
illiquid nature of the Secondary Market. Although the
total amount of value impaired sovereign debt exceeds
$1000 bn, only a tiny fraction of this can be considered
as tradeable at any time. The reason for this is simply
that most banks cannot afford the losses which they
would incur by selling for cash. A rough weighted
average price for IDC debt would be about 30 per cent
of face value; in order to sell without loss, a bank
would require provisions of over 70 per cent, and very
few have achieved this level. Those who have, tend to
heave a sigh of relief and drop the paper into the
bottom drawer; they are happy to collect the interest
income, which naturally looks high in relation to
assets on the books at perhaps one third of face value,
or even less.
The second major difference from a stockmarket is the
motivation of the buyers of the debt. Generally
speaking, the debt is not purchased by people who
expect the price to go up. There is an increasing
element of speculative activity by brokers in the
market but usually in small amounts on a short term
basis, because taking positions in a volatile, illiquid
market is highly dangerous. There are two basic types
of buyers: firstly, investors, either local or foreign,
who require the paper for conversion into local
currency to make investments or cancel indebtedness;
and, secondly, banks which are conducting swap
transactions - obviously having sold something they
(or an intermediary) have to buy something to
complete the swap.
The above characteristics must be borne in mind when
considering whether, and to what extent, various
factors will affect the market. One perhaps surjrising
feature is that economic or political events in LDCs,
positive or negative, have much less impact on the
market, at least in the short run, than might be
imagined. This observation may be explained as
follows: potential sellers of debt are constrained not by
optimism about the prospects of repayment, but by
their inability to absorb losses; potential buyers tend
to be looking for cheap investment opportunities. For
example, over the past year Yugoslavia's domestic
economic condition has deteriorated, with inflation
rising to over 1000 per cent; however, the price of the
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debt has risen from 42 to 56 over this period because of
the existence of a debt conversion programme.
Similarly the price of Chilean debt has been more
closely linked to the existence of, and changes to, the
country's debt-equity programme than to the
economic fundamentals.
The market is affected, negatively, by actions which
may impose pain on lenders. For example, a
suspension of interest payments lasting for more than
a few weeks obliges the banks to admit that these loans
are value impaired. The cost of funding non-
performing assets, coupled with pressure from
regulators, may induce banks to sell for cash or swap
into relatively more attractive countries. A demand
for new money will have a similar effect.
Certainly the market has been affected by increasing
levels of provisions made by lenders. Provisions
enhance the ability of banks to take losses.
Unfortunately, the market tends to anticipate such
action and prices promptly fall to below the latest
average provisioning levels.
At the risk of some over-simplification, the dynamics
of the secondary market may be said to represent a
balance between: 1) the supply of debt available from
banks willing and/or able to take the losses and 2) the
demand arising from official or informal debt
conversion programmes. Given the enormous potential
supply, it is not surprising that prices have tended to
fall. It should be noted that the existence of a debt-
equity programme in for example Chile does much
more than create demand for Chilean debt.
Intermediaries will naturally try to fulfil orders for
debt by buying for cash but if willing sellers are not
available at acceptable prices (which will be the case
more often than not) they will try to induce banks to
swap out of Chile into, perhaps, Mexico in return fora
fee. The intermediary will then have to buy Mexican
debt, creating demand for the latter. The market may
be perceived as a bath-tap with the tap on and the plug
out; cash sellers pour various types of debt into the
pool where it is swapped and swirled about, eventually
to flow out and be cancelled by debt conversions.
The Effect of Debt Reduction Plans on the
Market
Until very recently debt relief would have had a
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disastrous effect on the world's financial system,
wiping out the net worth of many large banks. Even
now it will prove distinctly uncomfortable for banks
with inadequate provisions, such as those in Japan
and Italy. Elsewhere, there is a growing acknow-
ledgement of the judgement of the market, i.e. that
these loans are worth much less than their face value.
There is no reason to suppose that such debt relief in
itself will have basic direct effects on the way the
market operates. It will simply introduce a new reason
for indulging in swap transactions.
It is noticeable that despite the fanfare surrounding
the Mexican agreement, Mexico's debt has fallen from
44to 36 over the past few months (admittedly a period
of falling prices in general). The fundamental point
about debt forgiveness is that it forces lenders to take
losses. Banks unable to do so have to swap out of
countries such as Mexico and into others deemed less
likely to follow suit.
Only 100 per cent debt forgiveness would have
(obviously) a major impact on the market and that is
not on the table except for a few African countries
which can never hope to service their debts and which
were never actively traded in the first place. However,
the Mexican Plan and its possible successors are
expected to have indirect effects on the secondary
market, and these are discussed below.
Possible Futures for the Market
The first possibility which we may call the wishful
thinking scenario from the creditors' point of view is
that, one after another, countries will enter into
rescheduling agreements with their creditors perhaps
with an element of debt reduction; pursue the
economic policies required to service their debts and
pay them off over, perhaps, 20 years. If creditors were
to believe that this was likely, sales at a discount would
diminish sharply, investors looking for yield would
bid prices up to par and the market would disappear.
As I earn my living as a trader of the debt you will not
be surprised to hear that in my opinion this scenario is
the least likely of all. However, I can advance solid
reasons for this opinion. The domestic sacrifices
required over many years are in most cases simply too
great for governments to demand and expect to
maintain political stability. How many regimes could
impose the internal discipline which enabled Romania
to repay its debt?
You may say that under this scenario debtor countries
would once again be perceived as creditworthy and
could raise voluntary new money to service existing
debts. However, most banks now acknowledge that
they allowed cross-border lending to expand beyond
prudence. They will take much convincing to re-start
lending to countries which have caused problems in
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the recent past. Romania is now effectively debt-free,
but despite its exemplary treatment of its creditors,
that country would not find it easy to raise new money.
In addition, if the secondary market price of a
country's debt is 35, why pay it back at 100 (or at 65
after an agreed debt reduction programme such as
Mexico's)? If the will exists t make at least some effort
to repay the debt, countries will prefer to buy back
their debt in the secondary market either: a) by
encouraging foreign investment and the return of
flight capital by allowing debt-equity conversion
schemes or b) by direct buy-backs either openly, like
Bolivia, or surreptitiously. Some take the view that
debt buy-backs at a discount are somehow immoral;
they should note that the Bank of England is openly
repurc.hasing the British National Debt at secondary
market prices.
Another scenario which puts me out of a job even
more rapidly is repudiation. If this happens, the debt
obviously becomes worthless. Even in this case, where
there is an effective, as opposed to formal,
repudiation, the debt continues to trade in the 'twilight
zone' below 10 per cent of face value. Examples would
be Peru, North Korea and Nicaragua. However, the
consequences of repudiation are severe: all access to
credit is cut off, trade stagnates, and the country's
reputation takes years to recover. How much easier to
agree a deal with creditors whereby they disburse new
money to service the interest on existing debt, and
agree to reschedule the principal.
Until recently, the only 'middle way' was the
'Perpetual Rescheduling' scenario. This involved at its
simplest sufficient economic adjustment to generate a
trade surplus, and a rescheduling of principal every
couple of years, probably with an element of new
money. This process ensured a flow of business for the
secondary market as banks would sell for cash or swap
out of countries to avoid calls for new money or
another tiresome round of reschedulings. This process
seems unlikely to continue. As banks increase their
provisions they become progressively less willing to
disburse new money; they have sufficient provisions to
absorb losses if they have to, and are naturally
reluctant to disburse new money which is then subject
to an immediate write-down.
The current trend towards economic reform in return
for partial debt forgiveness seems likely to prolong
the life of the secondary market and to affect it in
various ways. Firstly most of these new packages will
include, at the insistance of the banks, debt-equity
conversion options. These create demand for debt and
generate fee income for creditors and intermediaries.
They help to sustain activity in the market. Secondly,
we may expect to see a proliferation of debt
instruments. The Mexican Plan, for example, will, if
successful, generate two new types of bond and a new
money loan. This growth in the menu of options
should enable intermediaries to design swap packages
more closely matching the requirements of their
customers. The process will be aided by the improved
'tradeability' of the assets. In the early days of the
market it was common to encounter Loan Agreements
with vague, restrictive, or even completely absent
provisions for the assignment of participations.
Lenders viewed sovereign borrowers as clients, and
often felt that to trade loans would damage
relationships.
In practice, the borrowers do not care and lenders
these days place little or no value on relationships
which have proved to be so expensive. Consequently
most new restructuring agreements require no more
than a transfer certificate to be sent, after the event, to
the agent and/or the borrower. Bonds require even
less documentation. This trend will enable the market
to process transactions more rapidly and efficiently.
Until recently LDC debt was very obviously being
traded in a severe bear market. At current price levels,
however, adventurous investors are beginning to think
that the yield on certain countries' obligations
compensates for the risk. For example an interest yield
of over 25 per cent on Mexico may be attractive; even
after the new plan is in place, an investor who has
purchased the debt for 35 and then opted for the
principal discount bonds is still gaining an interest
yield of close to 20 per cent. As a rough rule ofthumb,
most LDCs could service half their existing debt
without difficulty. Consequently an investor pur-
chasing performing LDC loans for well under half
price is not likely to show serious losses. Not a play for
widows and orphans, but we may expect high yield
investors to play an increasing, if still small role in the
market.
Despite my opening remarks concerning the ability of
banks to take losses, this is also changing as banks
increase their provisions. Recently several banks have
taken the view that having made large provisions and
written down the debt to secondary market levels, they
should turn a problem into an opportunity by trading
the debt to generate fees. We may expect this process
to continue, and this must inevitably increase
competition in the market. Life will certainly become
more difficult for market players lacking either a
portfolio from which to operate or an established
niche in the business.
In conclusion, the market seems likely to display the
features of a mature market: many players, a wide
range of assets, and intensifying competition.
As a final note on the debt crisis, it is worth pointing
out to those hailing the Mexican Plan as a blueprint for
solving the problem, that, even if they are right, the
'good news' is that the lenders' shareholders may,
perhaps, be repaid one-half to two-thirds of the money
lent, before allowing for inflation, and over a very long
period of time. Hindsight may be a wonderful thing,
but in this case the crisis could have been avoided by
reference to previous experience.
Countries do go bust and have done so for centuries.
The first known debt default is recorded in the Old
Testament, when the Israelites were unable to pay the
Phoenicians for work done on the Temple of
Jerusalem. A later example is perhaps an even better
parallel of recent events. At the end of the Middle
Ages, the Bardi and Peruzzi were bankers in the
world's financial capital, Florence. Fat with profits
from loans to domestic industrialists and international
traders they were looking for lucrative lending
opportunities. They discovered a promising little
under-developed country: it was politically stable, had
a small population, and was the world's largest
exporter of industrial raw materials. It was called
England. The bankers lent very large sums to King
Edward III, secured on exports of wool. Instead of
using the money productively (from a banker's point
of view!) he used it to pay for the pursuit of a war
against France. Inflation soared as spending exceeded
revenues, and Edward was forced to debase the
currency. After Edward's victory at the Battle of
Crecy, England prospered, but he defaulted on his
debts. The Bardi and Peruzzi were ruined. Many
similar examples could be cited and the moral is a
simple one: sovereign lending has always been a
licence to lose money.
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